Abstract. Discussion of the relationship between chance and necessity in the West goes back at least to Democritus in the fifth century BCE, and was highlighted again in the twentieth century by Jacques Monod in Chance and Necessity. Monod contrasted "teleonomic" (directional but not directed) biological evolution with "teleologic" (purpose-driven) Biblical theology. This article uses that distinction in examining Zhu Xi's concepts of Heaven (in particular the "mandate" or "givenness" of Heaven) and tradition (focusing on the normative Confucian tradition, the "succession of the Way" or daotong). The result sheds light on the unique combination of rationality and transcendence in Neo-Confucian thought.
I. INTRODUCTION
Zhu Xi's 朱熹 (1130-1200) conceptions of Heaven and tradition were central to the philosophic framework of his system of Confucian thought and practice. Heaven (tian 天) provided an absolute point of synchronic orientation that legitimized the system by anchoring his values in the natural world. His conception of the Confucian traditionthe "succession of the Way" (daotong 道統) -functioned as a diachronic anchorage in the continuous "outflowing" (liuxing 流行) of the "principle of Heaven" (tianli 天理), or the natural ordering process. Given these central roles, an examination of the two concepts can shed fresh light on some of the basic features of Zhu Xi's system -in particular, the way it combines a rationalizing tendency with an openness to transcendence.
Zhu's understanding of Heaven and tradition are both revealed in the campaign he waged in the 1170s to persuade the "Neo-Confucians" of the Song dynasty (960-1279) that Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017-1073) had been the first true Confucian sage since Mencius (Mengzi 孟子), 1400 years earlier. This was an iconoclastic campaign, as the prevailing wisdom at the time was that Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032-1085) had been the first to revive the Confucian dao道 in the Song. Cheng Hao and his brother, Cheng Yi程頤 (1033-1107), were in fact the core during the 11 th century of what became the Cheng-Zhu school of Confucianism (socalled after them and Zhu Xi), and until Zhu Xi's campaign Zhou Dunyi was relatively uninfluential. While the Cheng brothers had studied with him for about a year when they were teenagers, Zhou's philosophical influence on them appeared to be minimal.
1 Therefore, when Cheng Hao died and Cheng Yi, in his eulogy, said that his elder brother had been the first to apprehend and revive the heart of Mencius' teachings, very few questioned the claim. Yet Zhu Xi, with his friend Zhang Shi張栻 (1133-1180), eventually overturned this consensus by arguing that Heaven had "chosen" Zhou Dunyi to revive the true Confucian tradition -what Mencius had called the "Way of the Sages" (shengren zhi dao 聖人之道 ) and Zhu Xi called the "succession of the Way" (daotong 道統 ). 2 
II. HEAVEN
Early Confucian conceptions of Heaven varied from a mysterious, semipersonalistic source of life and moral authority (e.g. for Confucius/Kongzi 孔子, 551-479 BCE) to a completely amoral realm of the natural world (e.g. for Xunzi 旬子, 3rd century BCE). Mencius (4th century BCE) occupied a middle ground on this spectrum, retaining the moral concern of Heaven's Mandate (tian ming 天命) but speaking of ming (mandate, decree) more abstractly. For Mencius, ming 命refers to the conditions of life that are beyond human control -what is simply "given, " like the assumptions of a geometric theorem. The realm of ming includes the 1 Probably the only direct influence was Cheng Yi's special appreciation of Confucius' disciple Yan Hui 顏回, whom Zhou Dunyi also admired. Cheng's essay, "What Master Yan Loved to Learn, " was written only a few years after the brothers had studied with Zhou, and contains some parallels with Zhou's Taijitu shuo 太極圖說 (Discussion of the Taiji Diagram). brute facts of our lives, such as where, when, and to whom we are born, which determine some of the parameters or limiting conditions within which our lives unfold. 3 From the perspective of the individual, ming is the realm of necessity: that which we cannot control. Human nature (xing 性) is also given or endowed by Heaven (as in the first line of the Zhongyong 4 ), but according to Mencius the goodness of human nature is given only in potential form, as certain moral feelings or dispositions (the "four beginnings"), which must be actively cultivated into the "four constant [universal] virtues. " So xing, for Mencius, concerns an area of life over which we do have some control.
5
The Neo-Confucians of the Song followed Mencius in thinking of Heaven in mostly naturalistic terms, yet still with a moral dimension. However, both tian and ming were partly reinterpreted: Heaven was the source of the cosmic order (li 理), which comprised both the natural order (tianli 天理) and the moral order (daoli 道理). 6 In the human being, one's nature (xing) was the instantiation of that order. 7 The good nature that Mencius had discussed was now called more specifically the "nature of Heaven-and-earth" (tiandi zhi xing 天地之性 ) or the "original nature" (ben xing 本性).
8 Ming (the given) continued to refer to the realm over which we have no control, but was now understood in terms of qi (psycho-physical-spiritual stuff), specifically the "endowment of qi" 4 "What is given (ming) by Heaven is called the nature. " Xing (nature) as Mencius uses it primarily denotes human nature (ren xing 人性), but the word itself means the "nature" of any thing, although not a static essence (more on this below).
5 Mencius 2A.6, 6A.6. Mencius discusses the relationship of xing and ming in 7A.2 and 7B.24, both of which will be discussed below.
6 The Song Confucians did not use these terms consistently with these meanings (often they are synonymous); these are my usages.
7 Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi said, "The nature is just principle/order" (性即理也 (qi bing 氣稟) given by Heaven, or the "physical nature" (qizhi zhi xing 氣質之性).
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Zhu Xi was less optimistic than Mencius had been concerning the ordinary person's possibility of becoming a Sage (shengren 聖人). Mencius, he said, had focused only on the "original nature" and its moral potential, while ignoring the physical nature in which the moral nature was embodied. That physical nature was responsible for feelings or dispositions (qing 清), not all of which were good. Selfish human desires (renyu 人欲), for example, obstructed the mind's ability to apprehend its moral nature. Until and unless the mind (xin 心) could become fully aware of its inherent morality it could not act as a proper guide for human behavior, and so the person could not put into effect in practice his or her moral nature, becoming an "authentic" (cheng 誠) human being. Thus the concept of the physical nature was the Cheng-Zhu answer to the problem of theodicy, in Mencian terms: if human nature is good, why is there evil?
III. THE DAOTONG
Since the continuity of the Confucian tradition depended on the appearance of sages who could fully actualize their moral potentials, the problem of the gaps in the tradition -for example the roughly five hundred year gap between the founders of the Zhou dynasty (11 th century BCE) and Confucius -was the cultural reflection of the problem of theodicy. Therefore it was explained by the same mechanism: the physical nature. For members of the Cheng-Zhu school in the 11 th and 12 th centuries CE, the most troubling gap was the most recent one, for it weakened their competitive position vis-à-vis Chan Buddhism and Daoism. Both of these traditions claimed, in different ways, to have direct access to the dao (more on this below). The Confucians, therefore, needed to do the same, but this required that they identify someone who had revived the Confucian dao since its occultation since Mencius. Cheng Yi made that claim for his brother shortly after Cheng Hao died:
After the demise of the Duke of Zhou, the Way of the sages was not carried on, and after the death of Mencius the teaching of the sages was not transmitted. When the Way was not carried on there was no good government for a hundred generations, and when the teaching was not transmitted, there were not true scholars for a thousand years. Even without good government, scholars could explain the way of good government for the edification of men and transmission to later generations, but without true [Confucian] scholars the world fell into darkness and people lost their way, human desires ran amok, and heavenly principles were extinguished. The Master [Cheng Hao] was born 1,400 years after Mencius and was able to recover the untransmitted teachings that survived in the classics, resolving to enlighten the people with this Way.
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Cheng Yi's account was accepted by the great majority of the brothers' many followers, including those in the early Southern Song dynasty In addition to shrine dedications Zhu Xi wrote at least nine other pieces making the claim that Zhou Dunyi had first revived the Way of the Sages. One of these is especially useful as a window into Zhu's understanding of heaven and tradition: the "Record of the reconstruction of Zhou Dunyi's library/study in Jiangzhou, " written in 1177.
14 In this piece he deals not only with Zhou Dunyi but also with the question of the ontological status of the Way during periods when it is neither being practiced nor taught. As mentioned above, these gaps threatened to invalidate the Song Confucians' claim to have authentic access to the ultimate "principle of the Way" (daoli). They thereby weakened the Confucian position in their competition with contemporary Buddhists and Daoists for the hearts and minds of Song literati, since both of those groups had ways of justifying their claims to afford direct access to the dao. Chan Buddhism, which was extremely popular among Song literati, 15 claimed to have an unbroken lineage of "patriarchs" (actually "ancestors, " zu 祖) dating back to the Buddha, through whom the "mind to mind transmission" of the Buddha's Dharma gave them direct access to the enlightened mind of the Buddha. Similarly, Daoists claimed that their psycho-physicalspiritual practices of visualization, meditation, and manipulation of qi throughout the body enabled them to transform that qi into spiritual embodiments of the Dao. Therefore Zhu Xi argued that the Confucian "learning of the Way" (daoxue 道學) likewise enabled people to "hear the Way" despite the long gaps in its historical propagation:
The Way has never been lost from the world. It is only that its being entrusted to man [to carry out] has sometimes been interrupted and In the circulation of qi there are inequalities [in terms] of homogeneity and heterogeneity, discontinuity and unity, so in the human endowment there are differences [in terms] of purity and turbidity, dullness and clarity. Therefore, how the dao is entrusted to man and carried out in the world is only due to what Heaven confers and humans receive. It is certainly not due to the clever and presumptious individual's ability to speculate and conjecture. [For example] the River Chart (Hetu 河 圖) came out [of the Yellow River] and the Eight Trigrams were drawn; the Luo Writing (Luoshu 洛書) appeared and the Nine Regions were arranged. 20 Confucius, in reference to the flourishing and decline of "this 16 The "four constant virtues" in Mencius 2A.6 and 6A.6. 17 The "five human relations" in Mencius 3A.4 and Zhongyong 20. 18 That is, the dao is the dynamic flow of cosmic order (li 理), which is immanent throughout the natural and social worlds.
19 That is, although social and political order can break down, it is nevertheless the case that things happen for reasons. Thus the presence of disorder in society does not mean that the natural and moral order (li) has ceased to exist.
20 Paraphrasing Yijing, Xici (Appended remarks) A.11.8 (Zhouyi benyi, 3:15a). The River Chart was a numerological diagram that appeared to the mythical sage Fuxi on the back of a dragon horse coming out of the Yellow River, and was used by him in his creation of the hexagrams and divination system of the Zhou Yi (or Yijing, Scripture of Change). The Luo Writing was a similar drawing that appeared to the mythical Yu the Great (founder of the Xia dynasty) on the shell of a spirit-tortoise as he was controlling the flooding of the Yellow River, and figured into his laying out of the Nine Regions of ancient China. Both diagrams had been associated with the Yijing ever since the Han culture" (siwen 斯文), 21 never failed to attribute it to Heaven. It is clear that the Sage did not deceive us in regard to this.
As for Master [Zhou] Lianxi, if he did not receive the propagation of this dao conferred by Heaven, how did he continue it so easily after such a long interruption, and bring it to light so abruptly after such extreme darkness?
With the decline of the Zhou and the death of Mencius, the propagation of this dao was not continued; even less so from the Qin through the Han, Jin, Sui and Tang, until our Song. Heaven and transmitted it to others, in order to likewise transmit the events of his life, to enable later gentlemen to contemplate, examine, and promote it. ...
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Zhu Xi's chief concerns here are the question of access to the dao across the long span of time since Mencius and the place of Zhou Dunyi in the lineage of Confucian sages. But in the course of addressing these points he reveals a set of assumptions about Heaven (tian 天) and traditionspecifically the "transmission of the succession of the Way" (daotong zhi chuan 道統之傳) -and it is these ideas that are the focus of the present paper. Zhu Xi's answer to the question of the metaphysical status of the Way during periods when it is not being practiced or taught is that even during these gaps it still resides in human nature (xing), and in fact is immanent in the li that orders the universe. This is the result of Heaven's decree (tianming), which is to say that it is natural, necessary, and beyond human control. He makes this claim about Heaven six times in the above text. The point has an important bearing on what it means to be a Confucian sage. In one respect there seems to be an element of chance, in terms of Zhou Dunyi having been born when the five planets were in conjunction in a region of the heavens associated with the god of literature and examinations -the business of ru 儒 (scholars). It is also significant that Zhu stresses that "what Heaven confers and humans receive ... is certainly not due to the clever and presumptious individual's ability to speculate and conjecture" -seemingly minimizing the uniqueness of the sage. In Zhu Xi's Yixue qimeng 易學啟蒙 (Introduction to the study of the Yijing 易經) he says something similar about the primordial sage, Fuxi 伏羲, the creator of the hexagram divination system. Fuxi, being the first sage, could only have perceived the dao on his own. His ability was natural and spontaneous (ziran 自然), which is to say that it was "given by Heaven. " How Here too we might be tempted to say that it is simply a matter of chance. But later in the Yixue qimeng he says of the River Chart and Luo Writing, "They both originate from the intention (yi 意) of Heaven. " 26 The same was true of Zhou Dunyi:
Only
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Similarly:
Only the Master received Heaven's gift and continued the succession of the Way (daotong), in order to connect the beginnings and ends and to help us later men.
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And Zhu Xi's student, Zhen Dexiu 真德秀 (1178-1235), put it this way:
Man could not have achieved this without the aid of Heaven. Likewise with the learning of the Four Masters, how could they have offered such novel views and put forward new interpretations, such as their predecessors had not been able to arrive at, were it not simply due to Heaven? 29 What we have in these texts is a curious combination of chance and intentionality. Attributing the rare appearance of sages to Heaven is exactly like attributing something to "an act of God, " which implies something beyond human control but (if taken literally) a willful act of a purposeful deity. In both cases the attribution can be taken literally or metaphorically. The Cheng-Zhu Confucians understood it metaphorically. The seemingly chance occurrences were neither random nor willful. In the "Record of the reconstruction of Zhou Dunyi's library" Zhu Xi says, "nothing lacks a definite li, " which is to say that everything happens for a reason. Therefore it is not random. And while Heaven seems to have a will or a mind (Cheng Yi had spoken of "the mind of Heaven and Earth to produce things" 30 ), that seeming intentionality is revealed in natural processes. In other words, natural, non-intentional processes result in events that may seem to be intentional but are not -like the modern understanding of biological evolution, which is directional (teleonomic) but not directed (teleologic). 31 The classical "Mandate of Heaven" (tianming 天命) similarly straddled this line between intentional and non-intentional action. Most people probably understood it as the willful choice of Heaven -conceived at least partly as a personalistic deity -to remove the authority to rule from one family and confer it on another, like the Biblical God choosing a person to be his prophet, or a Chinese deity possessing a spirit-medium. 32 But as we shall see, the Neo-Confucians rationalized tianming, much as they did the popular notion of "ghosts and spirits" (gui-shen 鬼神). They accepted the existence of ghosts and spirits but understood them as natural, not supernatural, phenomena. For example, Zhu Xi said that ghosts and spirits are natural manifestations of qi: "Gui and shen are nothing more than the growth and dispersion of yin and yang. " As early as the classical Confucian philosopher Xunzi some had understood Heaven to be simply the natural world (surely Xunzi was not the only person to do so). Although Zhu Xi likewise leaned toward the naturalistic side of the spectrum, he still retained an apparent suggestion of a moral will in his statements about Heaven, unlike Xunzi. His view of the appearance of sages like Fuxi and Zhou Dunyi is, I think it is fair to say, a Neo-Confucian analogue of revelation. Unlike Biblical revelation, it is not the deliberate action of a personal deity; hence terms like "the intention of Heaven" and "the mind of Heaven and Earth" are more metaphorical than literal. Yet the unfolding of "Heaven's principle" (tianli, the natural order) does have something like purpose or intentionality. Again, it is teleonomic, not teleologic; it has direction but no director. This can be seen in Zhu Xi's conception of ming 命, "mandate, decree, command, " to which we now turn.
IV. ZHU XI ON MING
There are two aspects to Zhu's understanding of ming: the internal and the external. 34 The internal ming is the individual's allotment of qi; more specifically, the quality of one's qi, one's "given" psychophysical constitution. Each person is born with a unique endowment of qi, which may be relatively clear and fine or relatively cloudy and impure. The relative clarity of one's qi -and it is crucial to remember that the mind/ heart (xin 心) is composed of qi -determines the degree of difficulty one will have in apprehending and understanding moral principle (li), both in the mind itself and in external things. Externally, ming refers to the circumstances in which one is born: whether one has a family and community with the means to physically, emotionally, and intellectually nourish one -variables that depend in part upon the state and its rulership. These factors were addressed by Mencius, who implied that those who fail to develop their moral natures do so because of the poor quality of these social environmental factors. 35 Taken together, these 34 Michael Nylan suggests this schema in her article on "Ming" in the Routledge Curzon Encyclopedia of Confucianism, pp. 428-429.
35 Mencius never says this explicitly, at least in the record we have of his teachings, but it is the clear implication of what he does say. In his only recorded explicit response to the nature/nurture question (which is also the problem of theodicy in this context), he merely says that those who fail to nourish their moral natures do so because they fail to think, or fail to recognize the importance of their moral natures (Mencius 6a:15). This, internal and external dimensions of the given conditions of human life, over which we have no control (the realm of necessity), are the limiting factors in the process of self-transformation leading potentially to sagehood, and therefore also the limiting factors in the probability of sages appearing in any given era.
Zhu Xi focused primarily on the internal ming, i.e. the individual's endowment of qi, in his discussions of the individual process of selftransformation. But the rare appearance of sages who can continue the daotong is due to external ming, and it is the latter (external) that determines the former (internal). The external factors that determine one's configuration or allotment of qi at the time and place of one's birth even include the positions of the planets, as he mentions in his "Record of the reconstruction of Zhou Dunyi's library, " and the weather:
If the sun and moon are clear and bright, and the climate temperate and reasonable, the man born at such a time and endowed with such qi, which is clear, bright, well-blended, and strong, should be a good man. But if the sun and moon are darkened and gloomy, and the temperature abnormal, all this is evidence of violent qi. There is no doubt that if a man is endowed with such qi, he will be a bad man.
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Heaven is the source of these variables over which we have no control; they are what "Heaven decrees/gives" (tianming). But Heaven is also the source of the moral nature (xing), which is part of the natural order (tianli). Tianming is the impersonal "givenness" of necessity; tianli is the spontaneous, self-directing ordering process inherent in the natural world of qi. It is because li is the ordering process that li is inherently good: order per se is good in Confucian thought. This may be why Cheng Hao could make the seemingly unorthodox claim (for a Neo-Confucian) that even evil acts are li: they are li because they happen for reasons. In the human being, the natural ordering process, the "flowing forth" (liuxing 流行) of li, is the proper development by which one's moral potential is cultivated into full-fledged moral virtues, and is called the nature (xing).
38 But this proper development is not inevitable (obviously); it can be short-circuited by both internal and external factors. The internal self-limiting factors result from a less than fine endowment of qi; externally they include environmental factors, some of which can be avoided. Zhu Xi's comments on two passages in the Mencius are particularly illuminating on this point. In the first of these Mencius introduces a distinction between "proper" (zheng 正) and "improper" (feizheng 非正) ming. According to Mencius 7A.2: 39 Mencius said: Though nothing happens that is not due to ming 命, one accepts willingly only what is proper (zheng 正).
Zhu Xi comments:
At people's birth what is auspicious and inauspicious, unfortunate and fortunate, are both what is given (ming) by Heaven. But only that which is beyond one's control is proper ming. So the superior person cultivates himself and waits for it. That is why he willing accepts it.
Here Zhu Xi underscores the idea that ming "proper" refers to what is beyond our control, like the time and place of one's birth, or one's parentage. Mencius continues:
Therefore one who understands ming does not stand under a crumbling wall.
Zhu Xi:
"Ming" here means proper ming. A crumbling wall is one that is about to fall. If one understands proper ming one doesn't stand in a dangerous spot to accept the misfortune of annihilation. To do one's best, to fulfill one's moral potential (de 德), is to act in accordance with what we can metaphorically call Heaven's "moral will" or "command" (tianming). That is all one can and should do. If despite having done this one suffers misfortune, that is beyond one's control. It too is due to Heaven because whatever causes the misfortune is not a random event; there is a principle (li) to it. But it is not the proper, natural result of one's moral behavior, and it is not the natural course of development of one's moral nature, so it is not one's proper ming.
Mencius continues:
To die in fetters is not a proper ming (fei zheng ming).
Zhu Xi comments:
"Fetters" are the punishment of a criminal, so this says that dying from a criminal offence and standing under a crumbling wall are both human choices; they are not done by Heaven.
Again, one can avoid dying in fetters by making proper choices, so this too is not one's proper ming. The point of the distinction between proper and improper ming is that, of those things that happen to us, some are inevitable and necessary and others can be avoided by wise choices. Both of these categories are due to Heaven; or in Zhu Xi's terms, both are part of the natural order (tianli). But the avoidable misfortunes are not the natural course of development of one's Heaven-given nature. This natural course of development, I suggest, is the "real" mechanism (according to Zhu Xi) that is metaphorically called "obeying Heaven's will/command. " I understand it as follows:
According to Mencius we are born with certain natural feelings or dispositions (qing 情), such as the "four beginnings" (si duan 四 端 ), which, when cultivated, develop into full-fledged virtues (de 德).
The four beginnings are one's moral potential -"potential" not in the sense of mere possibility, but more like the concept of "potential energy" in physics. Potential energy, such as when I expend physiological energy by lifting an object, is something that actually exists: my physiological energy is converted into the potential energy now present in the object. When I let go of the object its potential energy is converted into kinetic energy as it falls, since energy is neither created nor destroyed. The moral potential of the four beginnings is also like a vector: it has both magnitude and direction. An acorn doesn't grow into a maple tree; it has a particular directionality; its normal course of development is to grow into an oak tree, and that is its xing ("nature"). For an old oak tree to die naturally and return to the earth would be its proper ming. Similarly, the natural, unimpeded development of our moral potential in its inherent directionality tending towards virtue is human nature, and "to die after fulfilling one's Way is proper ming. " Here the words "fate" or "destiny" can loosely, metaphorically be applied to ming, although I think they are misleading as translations. If there are external limiting factors, such as inadequate education or (in the case of Ox Mountain in Mencius 6A.8) cattle grazing on a green mountain and stripping it bare, that is not proper ming. So to act according to the innate moral tendencies "given" to us by Heaven (i.e. natural), and to overcome the psycho-physical and environmental limitations that are also "given" to us, is to realize one's "proper" ming. Since we have the choice whether and how thoroughly to overcome our limitations and realize our innate tendencies, Mencius prefers to regard their development as xing. In 7B.24 he says: 40 The mouth's relation to tastes, the eye's to colors, the ear's to sounds, the nose's to smells, and the four limbs' to ease are natural (xing 性). Yet ming is also there [i.e. they are given], so the junzi 君子does not call them xing.
Zhu Xi's comment:
Master Cheng said: These five desires are natural, but they are alloted (fen 分) and cannot always be what we desire, so they are given (ming).
One's sensory functions are natural, innate, and part of what defines being human; to this extent they are part of our "nature. " But one who is devoted to pursuing the Confucian dao -i.e. a junzi -recognizes that one has no choice about them, and so applies the distinction described above to them, distinguishing between what we have choice about and what we do not. By this definition our sensory functions are ming: they are both "given" and necessary. Mencius continues:
Humanity between father and son, rightness between master and servant, ritual propriety between guest and host, wisdom between worthies, and the sage in the Way of Heaven are given (ming). Yet xing is also there, so the junzi does not call them ming.
Zhu Xi comments:
Master Cheng said: Humanity, rightness, ritual propriety, and wisdom are the Way of Heaven. In humans they are bestowed in what is given (ming); they are the density and clarity of the [physical] endowment [or the "physical nature, " qizhi zhi xing 氣質之性]. But they are also the goodness of human nature (xing), which can be learned and fulfilled. Therefore we do not call them ming.
Here Mencius and Zhu Xi implicitly apply Mencius' claim that the goodness (actually the moral potential, as described above) of human nature is natural, which is to say that it is "given by Heaven. " As the first line of the Zhongyong clarifies, "What is given by Heaven (tian ming) is human nature (xing). " And as Confucius had said, "Heaven gave birth to the virtue (de) in me. " 41 To say that human nature is given (by Heaven) is to say that xing is ming. But since we do have choices whether or how thoroughly to cultivate the moral potential of our nature, we should consider it xing, not ming.
V. TIANMING AND DAOTONG
Since both the individual's fulfillment of his/her moral nature and the appearance of sages who can propagate the Way are matters of tianming, we can apply this notion of proper ming to Zhu Xi's understanding of the Confucian tradition (daotong). When he says that the "periods of clarity and periods of obscurity" in the propagation of the Way are "all the result of the Decree of Heaven (tianming 天命), " he is saying that the "proper ming" would be for the Way always to prevail. But "chance" events intervene, preventing the dao from prevailing. (Again, I am not using "chance" in the sense of randomness, but more like the chance coincidence of two independent lines of causation.) These chance events would be the inverse of the chance events that give rise to sages like 41 Analects 7:22. Zhou Dunyi. That is, just as a unique configuration of qi in a certain time and place gave rise to the sage, in other times and places it did not. Therefore the world is like a person standing under a crumbling wall (to use Mencius' example), and it suffers the consequences: long periods without sages. These consequences are not random -i.e. they do have rational causes -but neither are they what is "meant" to happen, in the teleonomic (directional but not directed), not teleogical, sense. That is, the interruptions in the transmission of the Way are divergences from the natural course of events, like disease in an organism, or a flourishing oak tree that is felled by a logger. Zhu Xi's understanding of the natural course of development of a person's moral potential, which is metaphorically called Heaven's will or decree (tianming), is illustrated in a diagram drawn by a student of his in a letter to Zhu. The student was Zhao Zhidao 趙致道, who in the letter is contrasting Hu Hong's incorrect theory of evil with Zhou Dunyi's correct one: b e i n g a u t h e n t i c b e i n g a u t h e n t i c T h i s c l a r i f i e s Ma s t e r Z h o u ' s i d e a . T h i s d e mo n s t r a t e s Mr . Hu ' s e r r o r . In the diagram on the right, the straight line from "authenticity" (cheng 誠) through "incipience" (ji 幾) to "good" (shan 善) is the natural course of development of the Heaven-given nature. The "bad" (e 惡) is like a "parasitic growth" on a tree or an illegitimate descent-line in a family, as Zhao Zhidao explains in the letter, and Zhu Xi emphatically agrees.
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Therefore good and evil do not have equal status, as Hu Hong's model implies. This is what I mean by "divergence" from the natural course of events. On the cultural level, the gaps in the transmission of the Confucian tradition are divergences from "Heaven's will" in the same sense.
The rationalizing tendencies of Cheng-Zhu Confucianism have long been recognized. But their naturalistic, humanistic worldview was flexible enough to acknowledge the existence of gods, ghosts, and ancestors and to incorporate them into its natural philosophy. Likewise, it could accommodate a sense of transcendence, symbolized by Heaven, that was not supernatural. As Xunzi had suggested in the 3 rd century BCE, both the literate elite and common people could use the "language" of ritual offerings to ancestors, but the former (in Xunzi's view) understood it in psychological terms while the latter understood it as having to do with the literal existence of spirits. The Cheng-Zhu Confucians similarly used the language of a willfull Heaven but understood Heaven's will as the natural, "proper" development of the nature of things. The breadth and non-dualism of this way of thinking enabled Chinese intellectuals to contemplate and affirm all aspects of human experience, including religious experience. There was no sharp distinction, for example, between rationality and intuition, or thinking and feeling, because both elements in these pairs were functions of the "mind/heart, " or xin. They constructed a worldview in which rationality does not preclude or conflict with a sense of awe and an appreciation of mystery. As Zhu Xi put it, Yang ... is the beginning of things; yin ... is the end of things. If we are able to trace back to their beginnings and understand how they are generated, then we can turn to their ends and understand how they die. This is the ineffable mystery (buyan zhi miao 不言之妙) of the orderly process of creation, flowing from past to present throughout heaven and earth. 43 This way of thinking allows for "ineffable mystery, " but does not segregate it to a spiritual realm that is ontologically distinct from the mundane, physical realm. The ineffable mystery of creation is inherent in the world, not extrinsic to it. Christian process theologians, such as John Cobb and Gordon Kaufman, have said very much the same thing, based primarily on the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. Other modern thinkers, such as Thomas Berry, have written in a similar vein about "the great cosmic liturgy of the natural world, " a liturgy fully based on scientific understandings of the physical world, life, and evolution.
44 Zhu Xi's conceptions of Heaven and tradition are revealing windows into a premodern worldview of similar breadth and subtlety.
